BSP Podcast

Maria Jimena Clavel Vazquez - Naturalizing Heidegger (Against his Will)

This is one of the papers from our 2017 Annual Conference, the Future of Phenomenology. Information and the full conference booklet can be found at www.britishphenomenology.org.uk

The question regarding the pertinence of using Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein as a guide for empirical research arises from contemporary attempts to bring Heideggerian phenomenology and cognitive science together. I will focus on one of the main figures behind these attempts, Hubert Dreyfus. I will start by showing that Dreyfus argues in favour of the idea that Heideggerian phenomenology can be naturalized and made continuous with scientific research on the basis of two implicit premises: (a) the interpretation of the analytic of Dasein as a regional ontology; and (b) an account of the relation between phenomenology and science as a relation that holds between two disciplines of the same kind, but that stand at different levels. The aim of this paper is to show that it is not possible to defend these premises on Heideggerian grounds. I will do so by analysing Heidegger’s considerations regarding anthropology, psychology, and biology, and their difference with the analytic of Dasein. I will argue that the main difference can be found in Heidegger’s definition of phenomenological concepts (i.e. formal indications). Finally, I will argue that, although Dreyfus fails to take into account the nature of phenomenological concepts as a relevant methodological matter, his project of naturalization raises a valid concern regarding the possibility of taking Heidegger’s ontology back to a relation with the ontic sciences.

Pasi Heikkurinen: Ecophenomenosophy - A Response to the Anthropocene

This is one of the papers from our 2017 Annual Conference, the Future of Phenomenology. Information and the full conference booklet can be found at www.britishphenomenology.org.uk

 

According to Earth sciences, the planet has entered a new geological epoch. This epoch, referred to as the Anthropocene, is characterised by a significant human impact on nature and its processes. While humans have not equally contributed to the destruction of the non-human world, the dominance of this species calls for questioning the contemporary human condition. What is (now) wrong with ‘us’? The on-going widespread damage caused to the natural world, including the humankind, dates back (at least) to Industrial Revolution. The 19^th century transition to new manufacturing processes and its existential relevance is well captured in Heidegger’s critique of technology. Heidegger notes that, in its essence, modern technology is a mode of revealing (Gestell) that takes humans further away from being itself. Albeit successful in challenging the technological frame of the modern human, classic phenomenology, however, does not provide tangible alternatives to think about being in also ecological terms. This paper argues that in order to respond to the undesired anthropogenic changes in the Earth’s biosphere – e.g. rising greenhouse gas levels, ocean acidification, deforestation and biodiversity deterioration – phenomenology needs to go ‘green’. In the Anthropocene, investigations on the human condition cannot be separated from (the question of) nature and its non-human processes. Dasein is not only connected to nature but also embedded in it, as well as unfolding from it. In this paper, I will conjoin elements of (mainly late) Heidegger’s phenomenology with some key tenets of ecophilosophical thinking to reconsider the human place vis-à-vis the rest of nature. As a response to the problems of the Anthropocene, I will outline an ‘ecophenomenosophy’ that rejects human–nature dualism, challenges the idea of progress, and calls for a non-anthropocentric approach to phenomena in the age of humans.

Aoife McInerney - Practical Thinking

This is one of the papers from our 2017 Annual Conference, the Future of Phenomenology. Information and the full conference booklet can be found at www.britishphenomenology.org.uk

One understanding of the division between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ implies a gap between the spheres of thinking and acting that needs bridging. At the core of the matter lies a standoff between the contingency of acting and the enduring nature of thinking. However, this dichotomy conceals the interdependent nature of theory and practice in which thinking itself is an activity and manifests itself in the world through the inter-action of human beings.

No philosopher dissolves this gap between theory and practice as convincingly as Hannah Arendt in her reflections on both the vita activa and ‘the life of the mind’. By way of phenomenological method, Arendt reveals how engaged action opens a space for appearances and encounters, making the political domain her main phenomenological concern. However, this is not a critique of theory for the sake of it. Arendt also champions a way of thinking, specifically practical thinking, which is intricately connected to the political. Such thinking informs and culminates in worldly action and is concerned with phenomenality. The real issue, then, is not the division between theory and practice, but rather their more nuanced collocation.

After examining such a collocation, this paper will analyze how Arendt’s practical thinking is concretized in the idea of solidarity. Solidarity deals with the abstract values of human rights, while also entailing an essentially performative element. Arendt shows how essential it is to the integrity of this principle for there to be a political interaction. This paper aims to capture Arendt’s phenomenological insights into the interdependent nature of thinking and acting. I contend that an Arendtian account of solidarity allows us to move concretely beyond the seeming opposition between theory and practice, by showing how she argues that there is something wrong with the very framework of ‘applying theory in practice’.

Jakub Kowalewski - Levinas and the Deformalisation of Time

This is one of the papers from our 2017 Annual Conference, the Future of Phenomenology. Information and the full conference booklet can be found at www.britishphenomenology.org.uk

In a 1988 interview Levinas describes deformalisation of the notion of time as the essential theme of his research. Commentators have usually interpreted this central Levinasian idea as a provision of a concrete experience in which the formal structure of time is realised. Although correct, this accepted definition is too general. As I will demonstrate in my paper, for Levinas, different concrete experiences not only realise time differently, but, more importantly, are able to impact on the formal structure of time-consciousness itself. In order to defend this thesis, I will argue that Levinas understands the form of time-consciousness as governed by a three-aspect internal tendency or ‘conatus’: a striving for the present; a horizontal synchronisation of the past, present, and future experiences; and a self-projection into the infinite future.  I will then examine the deformalisation of time in the phenomena of responsibility, fecundity, and death, in order to show the three distinct ways in which these phenomena modify, or put into question, the conatus characteristic of the form of time-consciousness. I will claim that a) responsibility for another human being interrupts the striving for the present, b) fecundity, and the time of the child it promises, refuses horizontal synchronisation, and c) death renders impossible the futural self-projection. I will conclude by suggesting that it is responsibility which occupies a privileged position with regards to the other concrete experiences which allow for the deformalisation of the notion of time. 

 

Anna Yampolskaya - Aesthetical experience as tranformative: Henry and Maldiney on Kandinsky

This is one of the papers from our 2017 Annual Conference, the Future of Phenomenology. Information and the full conference booklet can be found at www.britishphenomenology.org.uk

I compare how two leading French phenomenologists of the last century – Michel Henry and Henri Maldiney – interpret Kandinsky’s heritage. Henry’s phenomenology is based on a distinction between two main modes of manifestation – the ordinary one, that is, the manifestation of the world and the “manifestation of life”; for him Kandinsky’s work provides a paradigmatic example of the second, more original, mode of manifestation, which is free from all forms of self-alienation. This is why Kandinsky’s paintings do no show us anything, but rather provoke in us certain impressions, certain feelings; they should be experienced, lived through. Henry claims that this living-though of the work of art is transformative; it is a kind of ascetic practice or mystical experience that goes beyond the distinction of the subject and the object. Maldiney also recognises in Kandinsky’s work an attempt to provide an access to an a-cosmic and a-historic experience of one’s inner self; yet for Maldiney this is not a positive characteristic. For Maldiney, the key distinction is not between modes of phenomenalisation, but between two dimensions of meaning (sens): the ordinary one, that he calls “gnostic” (gnosique), and “pathic”. This pathic dimension of meaning can be reached only in a personal contact with the living-world in its nascent state. According to Maldiney, there is no radical self-transformation which is not a transformation of one’s being-in- the-world and one’s meaning of the world (and vice versa). My access to myself cannot bypass my relation to the world, and so Kandinsky’s paintings cannot induce a true transformation of self. The disagreement of Henry and Maldiney on Kandinsky doesn’t unfold on the level of the phenomenological description of the concrete aesthetic experience, but rather on the level of metaphysics.

O. Bader and A. Peri-Bader - The Presence of Others and the Constitution of Extraordinary Architectural Space

This is one of the papers from our 2017 Annual Conference, the Future of Phenomenology. Information and the full conference booklet can be found at www.britishphenomenology.org.uk

Living with others is a key factor shaping our urban life. Their bodily presence scaffolds our social world and is involved in the way the built environment appears to us. In this article we highlight the influence of the embodied presence of other human beings on the constitution of a special type of urban architecture – the extraordinary architectural space such as museums, theaters, public libraries and central stations. Our analysis, which lies at the intersection between architecture, phenomenology and cognitive science, suggests that being in the direct presence of others constitutes this extraordinary architectural space in the sense that it transforms the built setting into a negotiated place and reveals for the subject some of its extraordinary properties. The architectural examples we discuss show that these intersubjective advantages are often embedded in and encouraged by the design of such built objects.

Jonathan Tuckett - The Cartesian Meditation of Pneuma: the Dasein of a Video Game Character

This is one of the papers from our 2017 Annual Conference, the Future of Phenomenology. Information and the full conference booklet can be found at www.britishphenomenology.org.uk

“A few seconds ago there was nothing. But now, here I am! There’s only one logical conclusion. I am God and this is my universe.”

The opening line to Pneuma: Breath of Life sets the scene for a video game that attempts something very odd for a video game to make the theme of its main story: Descartes’ cogito ergo sum—“I think, therefore I am”. Yet, this is exactly what this puzzle game seems to do; going so far, as the opening line indicates, as to critique Descartes’ formulation to suggest that the Cogito would think itself to be God. To a seasoned philosopher this “conclusion” may seem questionable, indeed some of the meditations that Pneuma proceeds to make from its position of deity would strike us as absurd and philosophically unsophisticated. But, as this paper means to show, this would be the very point of the game’s philosophical exploration: to show the absurdity of the Cartesian Meditation itself. Once this point is recognised, Pneuma reveals itself not to be an exploration of the Cogito, but an exploration of the being of Dasein. As such, contained in the seemingly absurd meditations of Pneuma are novel reflections on Heidegger’s notions of being-toward-death, authenticity and the they-self.

 

Zeigam Azizov - A Temporal Order of Things: Husserl’s ‘temporal objects’ and the (Industrial) Temporalisation of Consciousness

This is one of the papers from our 2017 Annual Conference, the Future of Phenomenology. Information and the full conference booklet can be found at www.britishphenomenology.org.uk

I will look at the concept of ‘a temporal object’ coined by Edmund Husserl and to address its complex development in the philosophy of technology by the French philosopher Bernard Stiegler as the question of the ‘temporalisation of consciousness’  . Husserl coined the term   ‘a temporal object’ in order to show that ‘the object of inquiry’ (the intention of the consciousness directed towards objects of the world)   is a temporal state of the investigation itself. This temporal state creates the condition for the existence of a temporal object, which gives the ‘striking  evidence’(‘schlagender Evidenz’)  . A temporal object means that the object is not only in time, but it is constituted through time and its flux coincides with the flux of consciousness. A temporal object plays the role in the constitution of the subject since it is an object towards which the consciousness is directed. The temporal object is the part  of  the content that it translates (this content is the world) . The consciousness is also a part of the content, but there is a difference: the temporal object perceived as a result of the intention may be developed by the consciousness differently:  the consciousness may accept this object but also may reject it. In both  cases  the ‘consciousness’ performs the evidence , whereas the temporal object makes  evidence available. The consciousness is the intention of the subject; the temporal object is the intentionality of the world. This idea is developed by Stiegler,  who applies the notion of temporal objects to his critique of the technical “industrial temporalisation of the consciousness under the pressure of  hyperindustrialisation” . I would like to show how in this process a problem of a  fatal separation between the object  and the subject is created and continues to influence contemporary thought in relation to technics and memory.

Mariam Shah - Typical Criminals: A Schutzian Inspired Theoretical Framework Exploring Type Formation and Potential Application in Magistrate’s Courts in England

This is one of the papers from our 2017 Annual Conference, the Future of Phenomenology. Information and the full conference booklet can be found at www.britishphenomenology.org.uk

This paper will review the potential reason for discrepancies in sentencing outcomes in magistrate’s courts in England.  Other disciplines such as criminology, psychology and sociology, have tried to explain why sentencing disparities occur, but have resulted in superficial analysis which has failed to penetrate to the core of this particular issue.  Through phenomenological inquiry, this paper will investigate how individuals involved in the criminal justice system could potentially be consciously and unconsciously influenced by innately determined types.  Conscious and unconscious reliance on subjectively determined types could allow assumptions to inform decision making, particularly when they are used indiscriminately and un-reflexively.  This paper will demonstrate how innately determined types could operate in practice in magistrate’s courts, and assess whether it is possible to interrupt these processes.

Niall Keane - Affective Demonstration and Speaking Communally: The Practice of Rhetoric

This is one of the papers from our 2017 Annual Conference, the Future of Phenomenology. Information and the full conference booklet can be found at www.britishphenomenology.org.uk

Heidegger’s interest in the themes of theory and practice have been well documented, especially his early lectures on Aristotle’s Ethics and his prioritization of praxis over theoria. However, a less explored way into the distinction between theory and practice is to be found in Heidegger’s SS1924 analysis of Aristotle’s Rhetoric (GA 18), which analyses rhetoric in terms of a practical dynamis rather than a techne. Rhetoric, for Heidegger, is a capacity to concretise practically the diverse ways of speaking together. Rhetoric identifies the most practically appropriate means of disclosing what speaks for itself, making something evident in its substantive character. 

In Heidegger’s SS1924 lecture course, he argues that the primacy of the practical attitude is represented in the proper use of pisteis, the means of persuasion, which in the parallel theoretical field of dialectic are termed syllogisms. Pistis is not simply about belief, but is a form of affective, embodied, and shared demonstration. In the end, the analogous nature of these two fields of logos, rhetoric and dialectic, practice and theory, hinges on their overlapping and yet distinct approaches to the question of demonstrable truth and how it is disclosed in a twofold manner, either by logical proof or affective demonstration. Logos is thus the fundamental determination of the communal and expressive life of the human being, and finds in rhetoric a degree of demonstrative force which discloses the modal character of truth, which is always tied to context, listener, and affect.

This paper will locate in Heidegger’s analysis of rhetoric an alternative way into the theory and practice distinction, by drawing attention to two types of thinking and speaking, theoretical and practical, and in conclusion the paper will address Heidegger’s attack on metaphysical modality in the name of a deeper and more essential blocked possibility. Heidegger’s reading of the rhetoric, the practical exercise of speaking and hearing together, is an early example of this. His interpretations of the affects of rhetoric are precisely an early attempt to draw our attention to blocked possibilities rooted in the practical attitude.