BSP Podcast

Jakub Kowalewski - Levinas and the Deformalisation of Time

This is one of the papers from our 2017 Annual Conference, the Future of Phenomenology. Information and the full conference booklet can be found at www.britishphenomenology.org.uk

In a 1988 interview Levinas describes deformalisation of the notion of time as the essential theme of his research. Commentators have usually interpreted this central Levinasian idea as a provision of a concrete experience in which the formal structure of time is realised. Although correct, this accepted definition is too general. As I will demonstrate in my paper, for Levinas, different concrete experiences not only realise time differently, but, more importantly, are able to impact on the formal structure of time-consciousness itself. In order to defend this thesis, I will argue that Levinas understands the form of time-consciousness as governed by a three-aspect internal tendency or ‘conatus’: a striving for the present; a horizontal synchronisation of the past, present, and future experiences; and a self-projection into the infinite future.  I will then examine the deformalisation of time in the phenomena of responsibility, fecundity, and death, in order to show the three distinct ways in which these phenomena modify, or put into question, the conatus characteristic of the form of time-consciousness. I will claim that a) responsibility for another human being interrupts the striving for the present, b) fecundity, and the time of the child it promises, refuses horizontal synchronisation, and c) death renders impossible the futural self-projection. I will conclude by suggesting that it is responsibility which occupies a privileged position with regards to the other concrete experiences which allow for the deformalisation of the notion of time. 

 

Anna Yampolskaya - Aesthetical experience as tranformative: Henry and Maldiney on Kandinsky

This is one of the papers from our 2017 Annual Conference, the Future of Phenomenology. Information and the full conference booklet can be found at www.britishphenomenology.org.uk

I compare how two leading French phenomenologists of the last century – Michel Henry and Henri Maldiney – interpret Kandinsky’s heritage. Henry’s phenomenology is based on a distinction between two main modes of manifestation – the ordinary one, that is, the manifestation of the world and the “manifestation of life”; for him Kandinsky’s work provides a paradigmatic example of the second, more original, mode of manifestation, which is free from all forms of self-alienation. This is why Kandinsky’s paintings do no show us anything, but rather provoke in us certain impressions, certain feelings; they should be experienced, lived through. Henry claims that this living-though of the work of art is transformative; it is a kind of ascetic practice or mystical experience that goes beyond the distinction of the subject and the object. Maldiney also recognises in Kandinsky’s work an attempt to provide an access to an a-cosmic and a-historic experience of one’s inner self; yet for Maldiney this is not a positive characteristic. For Maldiney, the key distinction is not between modes of phenomenalisation, but between two dimensions of meaning (sens): the ordinary one, that he calls “gnostic” (gnosique), and “pathic”. This pathic dimension of meaning can be reached only in a personal contact with the living-world in its nascent state. According to Maldiney, there is no radical self-transformation which is not a transformation of one’s being-in- the-world and one’s meaning of the world (and vice versa). My access to myself cannot bypass my relation to the world, and so Kandinsky’s paintings cannot induce a true transformation of self. The disagreement of Henry and Maldiney on Kandinsky doesn’t unfold on the level of the phenomenological description of the concrete aesthetic experience, but rather on the level of metaphysics.

O. Bader and A. Peri-Bader - The Presence of Others and the Constitution of Extraordinary Architectural Space

This is one of the papers from our 2017 Annual Conference, the Future of Phenomenology. Information and the full conference booklet can be found at www.britishphenomenology.org.uk

Living with others is a key factor shaping our urban life. Their bodily presence scaffolds our social world and is involved in the way the built environment appears to us. In this article we highlight the influence of the embodied presence of other human beings on the constitution of a special type of urban architecture – the extraordinary architectural space such as museums, theaters, public libraries and central stations. Our analysis, which lies at the intersection between architecture, phenomenology and cognitive science, suggests that being in the direct presence of others constitutes this extraordinary architectural space in the sense that it transforms the built setting into a negotiated place and reveals for the subject some of its extraordinary properties. The architectural examples we discuss show that these intersubjective advantages are often embedded in and encouraged by the design of such built objects.

Jonathan Tuckett - The Cartesian Meditation of Pneuma: the Dasein of a Video Game Character

This is one of the papers from our 2017 Annual Conference, the Future of Phenomenology. Information and the full conference booklet can be found at www.britishphenomenology.org.uk

“A few seconds ago there was nothing. But now, here I am! There’s only one logical conclusion. I am God and this is my universe.”

The opening line to Pneuma: Breath of Life sets the scene for a video game that attempts something very odd for a video game to make the theme of its main story: Descartes’ cogito ergo sum—“I think, therefore I am”. Yet, this is exactly what this puzzle game seems to do; going so far, as the opening line indicates, as to critique Descartes’ formulation to suggest that the Cogito would think itself to be God. To a seasoned philosopher this “conclusion” may seem questionable, indeed some of the meditations that Pneuma proceeds to make from its position of deity would strike us as absurd and philosophically unsophisticated. But, as this paper means to show, this would be the very point of the game’s philosophical exploration: to show the absurdity of the Cartesian Meditation itself. Once this point is recognised, Pneuma reveals itself not to be an exploration of the Cogito, but an exploration of the being of Dasein. As such, contained in the seemingly absurd meditations of Pneuma are novel reflections on Heidegger’s notions of being-toward-death, authenticity and the they-self.

 

Zeigam Azizov - A Temporal Order of Things: Husserl’s ‘temporal objects’ and the (Industrial) Temporalisation of Consciousness

This is one of the papers from our 2017 Annual Conference, the Future of Phenomenology. Information and the full conference booklet can be found at www.britishphenomenology.org.uk

I will look at the concept of ‘a temporal object’ coined by Edmund Husserl and to address its complex development in the philosophy of technology by the French philosopher Bernard Stiegler as the question of the ‘temporalisation of consciousness’  . Husserl coined the term   ‘a temporal object’ in order to show that ‘the object of inquiry’ (the intention of the consciousness directed towards objects of the world)   is a temporal state of the investigation itself. This temporal state creates the condition for the existence of a temporal object, which gives the ‘striking  evidence’(‘schlagender Evidenz’)  . A temporal object means that the object is not only in time, but it is constituted through time and its flux coincides with the flux of consciousness. A temporal object plays the role in the constitution of the subject since it is an object towards which the consciousness is directed. The temporal object is the part  of  the content that it translates (this content is the world) . The consciousness is also a part of the content, but there is a difference: the temporal object perceived as a result of the intention may be developed by the consciousness differently:  the consciousness may accept this object but also may reject it. In both  cases  the ‘consciousness’ performs the evidence , whereas the temporal object makes  evidence available. The consciousness is the intention of the subject; the temporal object is the intentionality of the world. This idea is developed by Stiegler,  who applies the notion of temporal objects to his critique of the technical “industrial temporalisation of the consciousness under the pressure of  hyperindustrialisation” . I would like to show how in this process a problem of a  fatal separation between the object  and the subject is created and continues to influence contemporary thought in relation to technics and memory.

Mariam Shah - Typical Criminals: A Schutzian Inspired Theoretical Framework Exploring Type Formation and Potential Application in Magistrate’s Courts in England

This is one of the papers from our 2017 Annual Conference, the Future of Phenomenology. Information and the full conference booklet can be found at www.britishphenomenology.org.uk

This paper will review the potential reason for discrepancies in sentencing outcomes in magistrate’s courts in England.  Other disciplines such as criminology, psychology and sociology, have tried to explain why sentencing disparities occur, but have resulted in superficial analysis which has failed to penetrate to the core of this particular issue.  Through phenomenological inquiry, this paper will investigate how individuals involved in the criminal justice system could potentially be consciously and unconsciously influenced by innately determined types.  Conscious and unconscious reliance on subjectively determined types could allow assumptions to inform decision making, particularly when they are used indiscriminately and un-reflexively.  This paper will demonstrate how innately determined types could operate in practice in magistrate’s courts, and assess whether it is possible to interrupt these processes.

Niall Keane - Affective Demonstration and Speaking Communally: The Practice of Rhetoric

This is one of the papers from our 2017 Annual Conference, the Future of Phenomenology. Information and the full conference booklet can be found at www.britishphenomenology.org.uk

Heidegger’s interest in the themes of theory and practice have been well documented, especially his early lectures on Aristotle’s Ethics and his prioritization of praxis over theoria. However, a less explored way into the distinction between theory and practice is to be found in Heidegger’s SS1924 analysis of Aristotle’s Rhetoric (GA 18), which analyses rhetoric in terms of a practical dynamis rather than a techne. Rhetoric, for Heidegger, is a capacity to concretise practically the diverse ways of speaking together. Rhetoric identifies the most practically appropriate means of disclosing what speaks for itself, making something evident in its substantive character. 

In Heidegger’s SS1924 lecture course, he argues that the primacy of the practical attitude is represented in the proper use of pisteis, the means of persuasion, which in the parallel theoretical field of dialectic are termed syllogisms. Pistis is not simply about belief, but is a form of affective, embodied, and shared demonstration. In the end, the analogous nature of these two fields of logos, rhetoric and dialectic, practice and theory, hinges on their overlapping and yet distinct approaches to the question of demonstrable truth and how it is disclosed in a twofold manner, either by logical proof or affective demonstration. Logos is thus the fundamental determination of the communal and expressive life of the human being, and finds in rhetoric a degree of demonstrative force which discloses the modal character of truth, which is always tied to context, listener, and affect.

This paper will locate in Heidegger’s analysis of rhetoric an alternative way into the theory and practice distinction, by drawing attention to two types of thinking and speaking, theoretical and practical, and in conclusion the paper will address Heidegger’s attack on metaphysical modality in the name of a deeper and more essential blocked possibility. Heidegger’s reading of the rhetoric, the practical exercise of speaking and hearing together, is an early example of this. His interpretations of the affects of rhetoric are precisely an early attempt to draw our attention to blocked possibilities rooted in the practical attitude.

Lillian Wilde - The Minimal Self in the Face of Trauma: Practical Applications of Phenomenological Theory

This is one of the papers from our 2017 Annual Conference, the Future of Phenomenology. Information and the full conference booklet can be found at www.britishphenomenology.org.uk

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Abstract

I shall contribute to the discussion of post-traumatic pathologies of the self from a phenomenological perspective. Does the self remain constant in severe post-traumatic pathologies, or is it impacted? I will employ a very thin notion of minimal selfhood, in line with Dan Zahavi. I am drawing on the works of Husserl, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty and shall argue that the minimal self is to be understood in a basic, prereflective sense. As the subjectivity inhabiting the point of view of experience it is intrinsic to experiential life and neither arratively nor socially constructed. Many authors amend the definition of minimal selfhood, making it more complex in order to proceed with arguments that subsequently make it vulnerable to shattering (Sass & Pienkos; Ataria & Somer). When applying these modified definitions, trauma appears to pose a significant threat to the minimal self. I will argue, on the contrary, that minimal selfhood is ubiquitous to experiential life and remains constant. However, that the minimal self is not threatened does not make post-traumatic pathologies of other dimensions of selfhood less severe. Disturbances in the sense of self, personal ownership, and experiential temporality can leave the traumatised individual devastated. A case study illustrates this. I consequently argue for a multidimensional account of selfhood that acknowledges the compatibility of different notions of the self such as narrative (Dennett) and social (Kyselo) accounts. It is the more complex notions of the self that are vulnerable to shattering. The evidence provided by trauma research thus encourages us to adopt a more complex conception of the self in order to account for its diachronicity, illuminates its fundamental fragility, and highlights the significance of the minimal self as a condition of possibility.

Edmund O’Toole - Phenomenology and Psychiatry

This is one of the papers from our 2017 Annual Conference, the Future of Phenomenology. Information and the full conference booklet can be found at www.britishphenomenology.org.uk

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Abstract

By the 1990’s biological psychiatry became the dominant approach in dealing with mental disorders. This resurgence began decades earlier in America, where the ‘biological turn’ was an attempt to reform psychiatry along empirical lines and reaffirm the authority and status of psychiatry. Bolstered by developments in pharmacology, the belief was that a revolutionary reorganization of the classification of mental disorders would lead to greater research and validity for the bio-categorical approach. This approach was generally regarded as providing a basis for greater reliability and validity in diagnosing disorders.

Subsequently much of the philosophical considerations in dealing with psychiatry were aimed at providing a scientific description of mental disorder and attempts to define scientific legitimacy. These relied on giving biologically based descriptions and explanations using evolutionary theory and the notion of biological dysfunction. However, critics pointed to the neglect of the phenomenological and intentional experience in psychopathology, many believed that the phenomenological experience should be the first and the most important point of reference, as meaningful expression, in the diagnosis of a condition or disorder. Mental states are phenomenological and intentional in nature but the casual explanation offered by the biological approach leads to the view of the subjective experience of mental disorder as symptomatic rather than meaningful. Biological accounts of functionality did not give the phenomenological experience as meaningful but rather a superficial byproduct of causal relations or underlying dysfunction.

This paper addresses this neglect of phenomenology in psychiatry and how it has impinged on the psychiatric process, from classification of mental disorders to diagnosis and treatment. I will reflect upon the importance of phenomenology for psychiatry socio-historically and why it is hermeneutically significant for multiple levels of consideration. As such, by focusing on phenomenology, this paper highlights the need to reconsider psychiatry as an interpretive science.

Luis Aguiar de Sousa - The Lived Body as ‘Tacit Cogito’ in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception

This is one of the papers from our 2017 Annual Conference, the Future of Phenomenology. Information and the full conference booklet can be found at www.britishphenomenology.org.uk

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Abstract

I will focus on Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the cogito, in particular as it is presented in the Phenomenology of Perception. As is well known, one of the central aims of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception is to formulate a radically new conception of subjectivity, that is, to introduce the idea of embodied subjectivity. What has received less attention is the connection between this idea and his explicit theory of the cogito. Since the notion of “lived body” does not explicitly appear in the chapter on the cogito from the Phenomenology of Perception, I will make the connection between these two notions to the effect that what Merleau-Ponty calls the “tacit cogito” will be seen to be precisely the “lived body”. The lived body is the most elementary form of subjectivity, upon which all other, more complex, forms are built. As a rudimentary form of awareness, the lived body opens us to the world, it accomplishes our most rudimentary contact with being. In this connection, I will point out that that Merleau-Ponty’s lived body constitutes a new version of Sartre’s pre-reflexive cogito. For both Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, all consciousness must ipso facto be selfconsciousness. However, this does not imply that all consciousness involves explicit reflection upon oneself. On the contrary, just like Sartre’s prereflective consciousness, Merleau-Ponty’s lived body is an impersonal, anonymous entity. Although the lived body possesses a certain type of reflexivity, it is not closed in on itself, rather it immediately finds itself outside in the world. Perception is the fundamental act by which the lived body is not only in contact with the world, but also and primordially with itself. The true cogito consists precisely in this selfcertainty of perception. Thus, Merleau-Ponty does not relinquish the notion of cogito, but rather radically reformulates it.